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PREFACE 
I wrote this thesis as part of the requirement of the 
University Honors Program at Southern Illinois University. The 
purpose of this paper is to describe and explain the many different 
theories of constitutional interpretation. I have placed all theories 
discussed in one of two categories: interpretist or noninterpretivist. 
This paper also attempts to analyze the way in which these theories 
of constitutional interpretation are implemented by the United States 
Supreme Court Justices who advocate them. The conclusion which 
I will reach is that, while a United States Supreme Court Justice 
may advocate a certain theory of constitutional interpretation, 
the one which he actually uses in deciding constitutional issues depends 
upon "whose ox is being gored." Finally, a suggested model of 
constitutional interpretation is offered. This model is not offered 
as a compromise between the theories previously discussed. It is 
offered because it is the one that is currently being used by United 
States Supreme Court Justices and it seems to be working fairly 
well. 
A special thanks is offered to Professor Albert Melone 
for his assistance in this project. 
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• INTRODUCTION 
In the field of constitutional law, there has recently been a debate 
over how much discretion should be afforded to judges who are interpreting 
the Constitution. This debate centers around the question, as phrased by 
Thomas C. Grey, "whether the constitutional text should be the sole source 
of law for the purposes of judicial review or whether judges should 
supplement the text with an unwritten constitution that is implicit in 
1precedent, practice and conventional morality. There are anumber of 
approaches which address this question. These conceptions can be divided 
into two basic categories: interpretivism and noninterpretivism. These 
two categories, which have been referred to as originalism and nonoriginalism 
2by some, each have many different theories which vary according to the 
amount of discretion they will allow the Court in interpreting the U. S. 
Constitution. 
For purposeE of this paper the two categories will be referred 
to as interpretivism and noninterpretivism and all the theories which are 
discussed fall into one of these two major categories. For the purposes 
of this paper, an interpretivist shall be defined as any theorist who, "accords 
binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its 
adopters,,3 and a noninterpretivist is defined as those who believe that, 
along with the constitutional text and the intentions of the Framers and 
ratifiers, other sources are also relevant in constitutional interpretation. 
A diagram which shows all of the constitutional theories discussed in this 
• 
paper is included on page two. 
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• INTERPRETIVISM 
The proponents of the interpretivist theory, which include former 
Attorney General Edwin Meese, Judge Robert Bark and Raoul Berger, have 
reawoken this argument of constitutional interpretation by arguing that 
the current United States Supreme Court has overstepped its power by 
handing down interpretations of constitutional issues which cannot be 
4discovered within the four corners of the Constitution. The supporters 
of this theory, however, vary greatly in the degree of discretion they will 
allow courts in deciding constitutional issues. 
TEXTUALSIM 
The theory of constitutional interpretation which allows the 
courts the least amount of discretion is referred to as strict textualism 
5by some and literaliS.m by others. 6 According to Cole, "Literalism is 
asserted as requiring that all constitutional interpretation consider only 
the text of the Constitution.,,7 This theory of constitutional interpretation 
was explained by Mr. Justice Owen Roberts in United States v. Butler 297 
.8U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 312, 318 (1936). 
There should be no misunderstanding 
as to the function of this court in such 
a case. It is sometimes said that the 
court assumes a power to overrule or 
control the action of the people's 
representatives. This is a misconception. 
The Constitution is the supreme law 
of the land ordained and established 
by the people. All Ie gislation must 
conform to the principles it lays down. 
When an act of Congress is appropriately 
challenged in the courts as not conforming 
to the constitutional mandate, the judicial 
branch of the government has only one 
• 
duty; to lay the the article of the 
Constitution which is invoked beside 
3 
• the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the court does, or can 
do, is to announce its considered judgment 
upon the question. The power it has, 
if such it may be called, is the power 
of judgment. 
Justice Hugo Black was also a supporter of literalism. He argued, 
"that judicial review is illegitimate if it is based on anything else other 
than the text of the constitution.,,9 Black, the principal exponent of 
literalism, supported this theory because he believed "that this approach 
would curb the appetite of judges to go outside of the Constitution and 
impose their own preferences, dressed up either as natural law or due 
10process." He did not want judges to be able to base their decisions on 
such vague grounds as what is fair, reasonable, fundamental, or decent. 
He wanted judges to "follow what our Constitution says, not what judges 
think it should have said."ll While this theory, that judges should apply 
only what the Constitution says and not look outside of it, may seem 
perfectly logical at first, it is simply not possible in most cases. Textualism 
12
works only when the constitutional provisions meaning is clear. For 
some provisions of the Constitution, this is all that is needed. For example, 
the constitutional provision which states, "no person shall be convicted 
of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, 
13 
or on confession in open court." A statute which attempted to vary 
the nature of proof necess.ary in treason cases would clearly violate this 
14
constitutional provision. Most theorisls would agree that in this example, 
the words of the Constitution are ali that should be used in deciding a case. 
Most problems arise in dealing with the more general provisions of the 
• 
Constitution such as "due process,,15 and "equal protection".16 It has 
4
 
• 
been recognized by most modern theorists that phrases such as these cannot 
be said to have one clear meaning that judges can simply apply in all cases 
which arise. In fact most modern scholars do not even consider literalism 
as a possible method of constitutional interpretation. Professor Paul Brest 
is quoted as saying, 17 
I bave devoted very little attention 
to the most extreme form of strict 
textualism - literalism. A thorough-going 
literalist understands a text to encompass 
all those and only those instances that 
come within its words read withont regard 
to its social or perhaps even its linguistic 
context. Because literalism poorly 
matches the ways in which we speak 
and write, it is unable to handle the 
ambiguity, vagueness and figurative 
usage that pervades natural languages, 
and produces emllamassingly silly results. 
ORIGINALISM 
All other theories which can be placed in the interpretivism 
category allow the courts to look beyond the simple words of the Constitution 
and look to what the Framers or ratifiers intended those words to mean 
in order to decide a certain provisions meaning. These theories, often 
referred to as originalism, moderate originalism, conceptualism, or simply 
interpretivism, "recognize the Constitutional text as binding, hut look beyond 
the mere textual language to the meaning that the Framers or the ratifiers 
intended.,,18 One of the most common theories of constitutional 
19interpretation, which is referred to as intentionalism by some and 
20
originalism by others, falls into this category. Brest says of this theory, 
"By contrast to the textualist, the intentionalist interprets a provision 
• 
by ascertaining the intentions of those who adopted it. The text of the 
5 
• provision is often a useful guide to the adopter~1 intentions, but does not enjoy a favored status over the other sources.,,21 Brest supports a certain 
kind of intentionalism which he has developed himself and termed "moderate 
originalism." Under this theory, the text of the Constitution is treated 
as authoritative, but many of its provisions are treated as inherently 
open-textured.,,22 He states that "the original understanding continues 
to be important in applying moderate originalism, however, judges are 
more concerned with the adopters' general purposes than with their intentions 
in a very precise sense.,,23 Even though Brest describes "moderate 
originalism" as his own theory, separate from originalism, the two theories 
seem to overlap in many ways and both seem similar to the theory that 
Robert Bork advocates in his essay, "Original Intent: The Only Legitimate 
Basis for Constitutional Decisionmaking." In this article he states,24 
It is important to be plain at the outset 
about what intentionalism means. It 
is not the notion that judges may apply 
a constitutional provision only to 
circumstances specifically contemplated 
by the Framers. In so narrow a form 
the philosophy is useless. Since we cannot 
know how the Framers would vote on 
specific cases today, in a very different 
world from the one they knew, no 
intentionalist of any sophistication employs 
the narrow version just descri bed. 
25He further states, "There is a version that is adequate to the task," and 
he uses a quote from Dean John Ely to demonstrate this version. 26 
What distinguishes interpretation [or 
intentionalism] from its opposite is the 
insistence that the work of the political 
branches is to be invalidated only in 
accord with the inference whose starting 
point, whose underlying premise is fairly 
• 
discoverable in the Constitution. That 
6 
• 
the complete inference will not 
be found there - because the 
situation is not likely to have 
been foreseen is generally 
common ground. 
In 'his article, "The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An 
Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review", Erwin Chemerinsky 
defines three different theories which can be found to fall within the 
interpretivist category, The first of these theories, literalism, was already 
discussed above. His second theory, originalism, borrows its definition 
from Paul Brest who defined originalism as "any approach to constitutional 
adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution 
27 
or the intentions of its adopters," This definition, which was used earlier 
to define the general category of interpretivism, was not used by Brest 
to describe a specific theory, but was instead used by him as a general 
heading under which he describes different methods of originalism, one 
of which is the one he comes to favor - moderate originalism. 
Yet, Chemerinsky finds originalism, under the same defintion 
as used by Brest, to be different from literalism and a third theory which 
he called "conceptualism." This third theory seems to be very similar to 
the theory that Paul Brest supported as "moderate originalism." Chemerinsky 
says that conceptualism "requires the Court to determine the underlying 
purpose of a constitutional provision and to apply this purpose in developing 
modern governing principles. ,,28 He says that this differs from his theory 
of originalism because conceptualism dues not require that the Court follow 
the Framers' specific intentions. Instead, the "Justices are asked to identify 
7• 
• the underlying "concepts" of a provision and to use it in formulating modern 29
"conceptions" to guide decisionmaking. 
EVALUTION OF INTERPRETIVISM 
These overlapping definitional problems make it very difficult 
to discuss the arguments why one interpretative theory should be favored 
over another. Because of this problem, and also because these theories 
are very similar, the arguments shall first be made for and against the 
originalist theory in general and then I will address the individual arguments 
of whether the adopters or Framers specific or general intentions should 
be followed. 
One of the arguments used by those who argue for the originalist 
theory is that this theory of constitutional interpretation was intended 
in the Constitution. Clifford Wallace, in his article, "Interpreting the 
Constitution: The Case for Judicial Restraint," argues that the Framers 
recognized the importance of interpreting the Constitution according to 
original intent. He quotes Madison as saying, "the sense in which the 
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation ... be not the guide 
in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable 
government, [nor] for a faithful exercise of its powers.,,30 Wallace further 
argues that originalism was intended by the Framers by quoting Jefferson 
as saying, "according to the safe and honest meaning contemplated by the 
plain understanding of the people at the time of its adoption - a meaning 
to be found in the explanations of those who advocated ... it.,,31 
Those who oppose origillalism argue that the Framers did not 
include in the Constitution any rules as to how it should be read, so it cannot 
• 8 
• be assumed that they felt that it should be interpreted in an originalist 
manner. They argue that even if it can be proven that some Framers did 
support original interpretation, it cannot be assumed that all of the Framers 
intended this or that all of the adopters of the Constitution even considered 
how the document would be interpreted. Professor Paul Brest in his article 
"The Misconceived Quest" argues:32 
The practice of statutory interpretation 
from the 18th through at least the 
mid-19th century suggests that the 
adopters assumed - if they assumed 
anything at all -a mode of interpretation 
that was more textualist than 
intentionalist. The plain meaning rule 
was frequently invoked; judicial recou.rse 
to legislative debates was virtually 
unknown and generally considered 
improper. Even after reference to 
extrinsiC sources became common, courts 
and commentators frequently asserted 
that the plain meaning of the text was 
the surest guide to the intent of the 
adopters. This poses obvious difficulties 
for an intentionalist whose very enterprise 
is premised on fidelity to original 
understanding. 
Professor Cole also points out that at the time the Constitution 
was drafted judicial interpretation was more textualist than intentionalist. 
He states, "It would appear, therefore. that a strong case could be made 
for the proposition that the Framers and ratifiers did not intend that the 
Constitution be interpreted in accord with any particular meaning of the 
drafters. ,,33 He further states that "the Framers' use of broad, general 
terminology in both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights would seem 
to strenghten this proposition.,,34
• 9 
• A second argument that is used by advocates of originalism is 
that because they are considering the intentions of those who framed and 
ratified the Constitution, this method of judicial review is compatible with 
democratic theory while noninterpretivists theories are not. Many judges 
and scholars have argued that the principle of majority rule is sacrificed 
if judicial decisions are based upon values that are not stated or implied 
in the Constitution. They claim that democracy requires unelected judges 
to defer to the decisions of popularly elected officials unless there is a 
clear violation of rights protected by the Framers of the Constitution. 35 
Supporters of originalism also argue that using the Constitution 
and the intentions of its Framers does not violate democracy because it 
was ratified by over a majority of all Americans and in modern times all 
Americans have given their consent to the Constitution as it is by living 
under the Constitution as it is and not changing it. This argument, often 
called the argument from contract, states that "the Constitution of the 
United States is understood as a sort of (social) contract (1) between the 
states and the national government, (2) among the three branches of the 
national government, and (3) between the people and those who govern 
,,36them. Thomas Grey, in his article "Do We Have an Unwritten 
Constitution?" says of the originalist theory (as supported by Meers, Bork, 
Linde and Ely)37 
The chief virtue of this view is that 
it supports judicial review while answering 
the charge that the practice is 
undemocratic. Under the pure interpretive 
model, when a court strikes down a popular 
statute or practice as unconstitutional, 
• 
it may always reply to the resulting 
public outcry: 'We didn't do it - you 
10 
• 
did." The people have chosen the principle 
that the statute or practice violated, 
have designated it as fundamental, and 
have written it down in the text of the 
Constitution for the judges to interpret 
and apply. 
Michael Perry, in his article, "The Authority of Text, Tradition 
and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation," says that these 
two arguments, the argument from contract and the argument from 
democracy, are two separate arguments and "to succeed (or fail) in meeting 
one does not entail success (or failure) in meeting the other.,,38 He makes 
this point by saying: 39 
The issue of 'activist' or 'nonoriginalist' 
judicial review and democracy might 
engage even in a society without a written 
constitution and therefore without 
ratifiers, if that society (1) is committed 
to democratic government but (2) has 
an electorally unaccountable judiciary 
that opposes itself, in the name of some 
'fundamental' but unwritten law, to the 
electorally accountable branches of 
government. By contrast, the argument 
from contract is available only in a society, 
like ours, with a written constitution 
(and therefore Framers). The success 
or failure of the argument from democracy 
depends upon which conception of 
democracy one wishes to employ. . . 
To presuppose the authoritative status 
of a particular conception is to be g the 
question. One must argue for a particular 
conception. (To argue for a particular 
conception of democracy, of judicial 
role within the overall governmental 
apparatus, is to argue for a particular 
conception of constitutional text and 
interpretation, namely, the conception 
entailed by the judicial role in question.) 
Perry also says of the argument from contract,40 
• 
The argument from contract is predicated 
on the originalist conception of the text. 
11 
• Again, however, that conception of the text is not axiomatic for the American 
political tradition. Any conception of 
the text must be defended; an argument 
in support of the originalist conception 
that proceeds by reference to the ratifiers' 
understanding is, of course, question-begging. 
Perry goes on to conclude that "the argument from contract, like the 
argument from democracy, reduces to whatever contingent, speculative, 
provisional, and revisable arguments can be given in support of the originalist 
conception of constitutional text and judicial role.,,41 
Another problem pointed out by opponents of originalism is: 
whose intent is relevant for the purposes of this interpretive theory, the 
Framers' or the ratifiers,?42 The Constitution makes its own adoption 
contingent on "The Ratification of the Conventions of nine states 
Thus it would seem that the intent of the state conventions would be relevant 
to the originalists in the application of their interpretive theory. This 
same principle would also seem to apply to Constitutional amendments 
44because as the Constitution states:
The Congress... shall propose amendments 
to this Constitution, or on the application 
of the legislatures of two-thirds of the 
several states, shall call a convention 
for proposing amendments, which in 
either case, shall be valid to all intents 
and purposes, as part of this Constitution, 
when ratified by the legislature of 
three-fourths of the several states, or 
by conventions in three-fourths thereof, 
as the one of the other mode of ratification 
may be proposed by Congress. 
John Hart Ely also recognizes the problem uf determining whether 
the Framers' or the ratifiers' intent is relevant. In his article "Constitutional 
• 
12 
• Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility", he states,45 
Congress' role in the process of 
constitutional amendment is solely, to 
use the Constitution's word, one of 
'proposing' provisions to the states: to 
become law such a provision must be 
ratified by three quarters of the state 
legislatures. Now obviously there is 
no principled basis on which the intent 
of those voting to ratify can be counted 
less crucial in determining the 'true 
meaning' of a constitutional provision 
than the intent of those who proposed 
it. 
John Hart Ely also recognizes the difficulty in ascertaining the intentions 
of the ratifiers. He goes on to state:46 
That, however, gets to be so many 
different people in so many different 
circumstances that one cannot hope 
to gather a reliable picture of their 
intentions from any perusal of the 
Ie gislative history. (To complicate matters 
further, state ratification debates, 
assuming there are debates· often are 
not even recorded.) Thus the only reliable 
evidence of what 'the ratifiers' thought 
they were ratifiying is obviously the 
language of the provisions they approved. 
The debates (or for that matter other 
contemporary sources) can serve the 
'dictionary function' of resolving 
ambiguities ... but that function fulfilled, 
the critical record of what was meant 
to be proposed and ratified is what was 
proposed and ratified. 
Other evidence given to support the theory that the intentions 
of the ratifiers should be given priority over the intentions of the Framers' 
is given by Cole in his article, "Constitutional Interpretation: A Bicentennial 
Reflection." In this article he quotes a passage from a letter from James 
• 
Madison to Andrew Stevenson which states, "I cannot but highly approve 
13 
• the industry with which you have searched for a key to the sense of the Constitution, where alone the true one can be found, in the proceedings 
of the Convention, contemporary [sic] expositions [The Federalist] and, 
above all, in the ratifying conventions of the States.,,47 From this and 
other evidence, Cole goes on to conclude that, "[i]t would certainly appear 
that the originalism which looks beyond that which was proposed and ratified, 
would require one to look to the ratifiers' intent, not the Framers' intent. 
Certainly, both the constitutional text and the commentators' comments 
indicate that the ratifiers' intent is to be preferred over that of the 
Framers.,,48 
If it is the ratifiers' intent which is relevant rather than that 
of the Framers, this poses an even bigger problem for originalists. How 
is the relevant intent to be discovered, assuming it is discoverable? Cole 
points out a major problem this presents for the originalist theory by stating, 
"in order for originalism to be a viable interpretive theory, evidence of 
a firm intent must be available, the evidence must be sufficient to render 
the interpretation of 'intent' credible. Furthermore, the 'intent' must 
distinguish adequately between the adopters' personal views about an issue 
9
and their intentions concerning its constitutional resolu tion. ,,4
Paul Brest, in his article "The Misconceived Quest", argues that 
under the theory which he calls intentionalism, it is the adopters' intentions 
which must be ascertained in order to interpret the Constitution. In defining 
50
who the adopters were, Brest states, 
The adopters of the Constitution of 1787 
were some portion of the delegates to 
the Philadelphia Convention and majorities 
• 14 
•	 or supermajorities of the participants in the ratifying conventions in nine states. 
For all but one amendment to the 
Constitution, the adopters were two-thirds 
or more of the members of each House 
of Congress and at least a majority of 
the state legislatures. 
lie further states,"For a textual provision to become part of the Constitution, 
the requisite number of persons in each of these bodies must have assented 
to it. Likewise, an intention can only become binding - only become an 
institutional	 intention - when it is shared by at least the same number 
51
of adopters." Brest goes on to explain that, "if the only way a judge 
could ascertain institutional intent were to count individual intention-votes, 
her task would be impossible Therefore, an intentionalist must 
necessarily use circumstantial evidence to educe a collective or general 
intent.,,52 Brest goes on to explain how interpreters often treat the writings 
or statements of the Framers of a provision as evidence of the adopters' 
intent. Of this method he says, "This is a justifiable strategy for the 
moderate originalist who is only concerned with the Framers' intent on 
a relatively abstract level of generality - abstract enough to permit the 
inference that it reflects a broad social consensus rather than notions 
peculiar to a handful of the adopters. It is a problematic strategy for the 
strict originalist.,,53 
Cole is also aware of this problem. In the same essay which 
54 
was quoted above, he states, 
Assuming that it is possible to distinguish 
between an adopter's personal views 
and his intentions concerning the 
constitutional resolution of the issue, 
• 
which is doubtful when one recognizes 
the political nature of such intentions 
15 
• 
and decisions, some commentators would 
then require the interpreter to resolve 
the issue based on what the adopter 
would have done if faced with a 
modern-day problem - a problem which 
could not have been imagined in the 
world of the adopter. 
Cole goes on to explain that other definitions of moderate originalism or 
originalism would limit the interpreter to interpretive events and transactions 
with which the adopter was familiar. To illustrate that result of such a 
theory Cole quotes Professor Brest as saying n[e]ven if such an approach 
were coherent ... it would produce results that even a strict intentionalist 
would likely reject: Congress could not regulate any item of commerce 
or any mode of transportation that did not exist in 17B9; the first amendment 
would not protect any means of communication not then known. n55 Cole 
goes on to state that nBrest argues that a more coherent position regarding 
'when' the adopters' intent must be ascertained requires that such intent 
56be translated to address contemporary problems. Cole quotes Brest 
as saying, n[w]hen the interpreter engages in this sort of projection she 
is in a fantasy world more of her own than of the adopters' making.n57 
Cole goes on to conclude that, n[i]t certainly must be recoguized that with 
this theory of interpretation as defined by Professor Brest, substantial 
subjective discretion will be exercised by the interpreter in translating 
the .adopters' intent. n5B So that even though proponents of originalism 
may argue that their theory of judicial review is justifiable because they 
are following the adopters' intent, this still leaves the door open for the 
Court to interject its own personal view. 
NONINTERPRETIVISM 
• 
The recent dispute between former Attorney General Meese 
16
 
• and Supreme Court Justice Brennan has rehashed the longstanding argument between interpretivists and noninterpretivists. Justice Brennan says of 
the interpretivist argument, 59 
There are those who find legitimacy 
in fidelity to what they call 'the intentions 
of the Framers.' In its most doctrinaire 
incarnation, this view demands that 
Justices discern exactly what the Framers 
thought about the question under 
consideration and simply follow that 
intention in resolving the case before 
them. It is a view that feigns 
self-effecacing deference to the specific 
judgments of those who forged our original 
social compact. But in truth it is little 
more than arrogance cloaked with humility. 
It is arrogant to pretend that from our 
vantage we can gauge accurately the 
intent of the Framers on application 
of principles to specific, contemporary 
questions. 
Brennan goes on to advocate the noninterpretive model by saying,60 
We current Justices read the Constitution 
in the only way that we can: as Twentieth 
Century Americans. We look to the 
history of the time of framing and to 
the intervening history of interpretation. 
But the ultimate question must be, what 
do the words of the text mean in our 
time. For the genius of the Constitution 
rests not in any static meaning it might 
have had in a world that is dead and 
gone, but in the adaptability of its great 
principles to cope with current problems 
and current needs. What the constitutional 
fundamentals meant to the wisdom of 
other times cannot be their measure 
to the vision of our times. Similarly, 
what those fundamentals mean for us, 
our descendants will learn, cannot be 
the measure to the vision of their time. 
Noninterpretivism, like interpretivism, also contains many 
• 
different theories. Noninterpretivists all believe that, along with the 
17 
constitutional text and the intentions of the Framers' and ratifiers'. other• 
sources are also relevant in constitutional interpretation. These theories 
also vary according to the amount of discretion that the court is allowed 
in interpreting the Constitution. 
CONCEPTUALISM 
Conceptualism, a theory which was discussed earlier. may be 
seen as being on the borderline between interpretivism and noninterpretivism. 
As was stated earlier. this theory "requires the Court to determine the 
underlying purpose of a constitutional provision and to apply this purpose 
. d I' d .. . I ,,61 Thi h . Is f dm eve opmg mo ern govermng prmcIp es. s t eory IS a 0 re erre 
to as "moderate originalism." In discussing the problem with the interpretive 
model of discerning the intentions of the Framers'. it was pointed out that 
thi~ is less of a problem for the conceptualist theory than for the originalist 
theory because this theory allows the Court to "determine an underlying 
concept for the textual provision and to apply that concept as 'Twentieth 
Century Americans.1II62 While this aspect of conceptualism may make 
it easier to solve the problem of determining the adopters' intentions. it 
creates another problem. Because conceptualism is indeterminate. "it 
allows judges to interpret open-ended constitutional provisions to establish 
concepts which may be effected by the judges' predilections.,,63 
Conceptualism must be considered to be on the borderline between 
interpretivism and noninterpretivism because it deals with the general 
concepts intended by the adopters and applies them to todays modern 
problems. This mix on interpretivism and noninterpretivism is illustrated 
• 
18 
• by a quote from Professor Brest. 64 
The moderate originalist acknowledges 
that the text and original history are 
often indeterminate and that the 
elaboration of constitutional doctrine 
must often proceed by adjudication based 
on precedent, public values and the like. 
But adjudication may not proceed in 
the absence of authorization from some 
original source, and when the text or 
original history speaks clearly it is binding. 
Conceptualism as a theory of constitutional interpretation is 
obviously very popular among modern theorists. It answers the question 
posed to originalists, how are the adopters' intentions to be ascertained? 
Yet it does not allow courts total discretion in deciding constitutional issues 
because as pointed out above in the quote from Paul Brest "adjudication 
may not proceed in the absence of authorization form some original 
source.,,65 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 
Some nonoriginalists feel that the Court should not be limited 
in their interpretation to the text of the Constitution and the basic concepts 
which were envisioned by its adopters'. Grey and Jacobsohn, for example, 
claim that " the natural rights tradition of the 18th century created a 
reservoir of legally binding principles that could be drawn upon by judges 
as an unwritten constitution, supplementary to the written one.,,66 Thomas 
Grey, in his article "Do \\Ie Have an Unwritten Constitution?" explains 
this view by stating, "it does not deny that the Constitution is a written 
document, expressing some clear and positive restraints upon governmental 
power. Nor does it deny that part of the business of judicial review consists 
19• 
• 67of giving effect to these explicit commands." He goes on to explain 
that "[w]here the broader view of judicial review diverges from the pure 
interpretive model is in its acceptance of the court's additional role as 
the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment, 
even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive 
law in the written Constitution.,,68 
Grey and others argue that this is the method of constitutional 
interpretation which is currently being used by the United States Supreme 
Court to decide many recent constitutional issues including the recent 
abortion cases and it seems to be working fairly well. Grey goes on to 
argue that if the Court were to actually employ a pure interpretive model, 
69
many long established individual rights would no longer exist. Grey states: 
there is serious question how much of 
the law prohibiting state racial 
discrimination can survive honest 
application of the interpretive model. 
It is clear that the equal protection clause 
was meant to prohibit some forms of 
discrimination. most obviously those 
enacted in the Black Codes. It is equally 
clear from legislative history that the 
clause was not intended to guarantee 
equal political rights, such as the right 
to vote or to run for office, and perhaps 
including the rights to serve on juries. 
Grey also states that under the interpretive model. "modern 
applications of the Bill of Rights based on their capacity to grow or develop 
with changing social values would have to be discarded.,,70 Grey goes on 
to conclude that, "it should be clear that an extraordinarily radical purge 
of established constitutional doctrine would be reqUired if we candidly 
• 
and consistently applied the pure interpretive model.,,71 
20 
• Louis Fisher points out that this idea of fundamental law has been recognized by many Supreme Court Justices. He quotes Chief Justice 
Marshall's statement in Fletcher v. Peck in which he stated that "there 
are certain great principles of justice, whose authority is universally 
acknowledged, that ought not to be entirely disregarded."n Fisher also 
quotes Justice Johnson in the same case as saying, "I do not hesitate to 
declare, that a state does not possess the power of revoking its own grants. 
But I do it, on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things. a 
principle which will impose laws even on the Deity.,,73 From this it is 
clear that principles of "fundamental law" have been applied by certain 
Justices in some cases and as Grey states it is also quite possible that if 
"fundamental law" had not been applied and the pure interpretive model 
had, rights that are now taken for granted would have never been recognized. 
SYMBOLISM 
The same overlapping definitional problem which was noted in 
discussing the interpretivist theories is also encountered in discussing the 
noninterpretivists theories. The third theory of noninterpretivism seems 
to be very similar to the fundamental law theory, but it seems to give the 
court even more discretion in deciding constitutional issues. Symbolism 
is broadly defined as "a theory of constitutional interpretation that allows 
the Court to utilize fundamental aspirations of American history and 
tradition (as 'found' by the Court) in determining the constitutionality of 
actions of the government's political branches.,,74 The main proponent 
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of symbolism, Professor Michael Perry, asserts this theory as follows:
Just as there is not plausible textual 
• 
or historical justification for 
21 
• noninterpretive review, there is likewise no airtight textual or historical justification of most interpretive review. 
There is, however, a compelling functional 
justification for interpretive review 
specifically, a justification based 
on the function the practice serves in 
our system of government. If 
noninterpretive review also serves a 
crucial governmental function that no 
other practice can realistically be expected 
to serve, and serves it in a manner that 
accommodates the principle of electorally 
accountable policymaking, that function 
constitu tes the justification for the 
practice. Noninterpretive review involves 
the definition, elaboration, and 
enforcement of values beyond merely 
those constitutionalized by the Framers 
. . . It is the function of deciding what 
rights, beyond those the Framers' specified, 
that individuals should and shall have 
against the government. 
Three noninterpretive theories, which are defined by Chemerinsky 
in his article which was cited earlier, are all very similar to the broad 
definition of symbolism which is used by Professor Perry. The first of these 
is "cultural values" which "requires the Court to use basic social values 
not expressed in the constitutional text as the basis for constitutional 
interpretation.,,76 As Cole says, "[t]his indeterminate theory of 
interpretation places no meaningful limitation upon the Court's discretion 
in that cultural values can be identified to support almost every 
conclusion. ,,7 7 
A second theory similar to symbolism which Chemerinsky describes 
and which is also supported by John Ely, is "process-based modernism." 
• 
This theory "permits the Court to decide cases on the basis of contemporary 
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• values, but limits such discretion to improving the process of representation 
or adjUdication.,,78 Chemerinsky explains that under this theory "the Court 
is obligated to use the originalism paradigm except for matters that relate 
to fair processes of government. In this area, the Court may act on norms 
not mentioned in the Constitution or intended by the Framers.,,79 Cole 
points out a major problem with this theory by stating. "[o]ne should 
recognize. however. that a broad judicial interpretation of "fair process" 
would serve to give extensive discretion to the interpreter.,,80 
The third theory identified by Chemerinsky which can also be 
seen as having characteristics similar to symbolism is "open-ended 
modernism." Open-ended' modernism allows the Court "to interpret all 
constitu tional provisions on the basis of contemporary values that the 
Justices regard as worthy of constitutional protection. The only limit under 
this approach is that the Court may not act contrary to the text of the 
Constitution.,,8l Under this theory "[t]he Court is accorded great discretion 
in determining which values are so important that they should be 
constitutionalized and therefore immunized from majority pressures.,,82 
All of these theories. which can be grouped under the general 
heading of symbolism. allow the Court to interpret the broad provisions 
of the Constitution. the ones which Perry states have "symbolic meaning" 
to fit our modern society and changing cultural values. But many argue 
that decisions of this nature should be left up to the electorally accountable 
officials. Perry says in response to the claim that his theory is undemocratic. 
"we should not assume that the value of electoral policymaking is more 
• 23 
desirable than other fundamental values - for example, protection of• 
individual rights. n83 
The many different theories of constitutional interpretation 
range from allowing the Court to use the Constitution only and no external 
materials to allOWing the Court to basically ignore the Constitution and 
to decide constitutional issues solely in terms of our modern societal values. 
While neither of these theories is likely to ever actually be implemented 
by the Court, the way in which the Court decides constitutional issues 
is likely to vary greatly according to what theory they use in their 
interpretation. And the theory which they use in their interpretation is 
also likely to vary as it has in the past. As Cole quotes Professor Perry 
as saying, n[c]onstitutional theory is, alas. an inconclusive enterprise . . 
. . The issue of judicial review can be settled only tentatively - never 
for all time.n84 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES IN PRACTICE 
In considering interpretivism and noninterpretivism as viable 
theories of constitutional interpretation, it is important to consider how 
each theory is implemented by the United States Supreme Court Justices. 
Craig R. Ducat, in his book Modes of Constitutional Interpretation, defines 
three different approaches which the Court can take in interpretive 
constitutional issues: absolutism, balancing of interests and preferred 
freedoms. The first of these modes, absolutism, is the traditional theory 
of judicial review which was articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury 
v. Madison. At the heart of the absolutist tradition is the concept of Rule 
• 
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of Law. Ducat states, "Rule of Law mandates the decision of controversies• 
objectively according to general, impartial, and fixed rules which do not 
acknowledge the individual identity of or personal consequences for particular 
litigants before a court.,,85 Ducat further states, "[t]he keystone in the 
representation of judicial decision-making, offered by the Rule of Law 
tradition, is the firm belief that judges merely apply law, they do not make 
1 •"t ,,86 
Justices who support the textualist approach in interpreting 
the Constitution will be most likely to employ the absolutist mode of 
constitutional interpretation. This can be illustrated by reviewing a portion 
of the quote from Mr. Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler which 
was cited earlier:87 
There should be no misunderstanding 
as to the function of this court in such 
a case. It is sometimes said that the 
court assumes a power to overrule or 
control the action of the people's 
representatives. This is a misconception. 
The Constitution is the supreme law 
of the land ordained and established 
by the people. All legislation must 
conform to the principles it lays down. 
Justices who follow originalism in its strictest form also use the absolutist 
mode of constitutional interpretation. Those who use a strict originalist 
appproach to interpreting the Constitution believe that the intentions of 
the Framers, when they speak clearly, must be followed in order to properly 
interpret the Constitution. This belief, if followed by Justices, would 
mandate the use of the absolutist mode of interpretation. Craig Ducat 
points out in his essay "Constitutional Interpretation" that two tools of 
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constitutional interpretation that are used by the absolutists are the "plain• 
88
meaning rule" and the "intentions of the Framers." He states:
The former signifies the notion that 
the words of the Constitution are to 
be taken at face value and are to be 
given their 'ordinary', 'accepted' meaning; 
the latter requires fidelity to what those 
who wrote the Constitution intended 
its provisions to mean. By relying upon 
these two tools, advocates of the 
traditional theory of constitutional 
interpretation seek to constrain the 
jUdges to act onlyas faithful conduits 
of the document and thus effect the 
reality of constitutional rather than 
judicial supremacy. 
The second mode of constitutional interpretation described by 
Ducat is the balancing of interests approach. Justices who use this approach 
believe that courts are political institutions. For the interest balancer, 
every case presents a conflict of competing social interests among which 
a choice must be made. Under this approach, "a statute is presumed to 
be constitutional which means that the burden of proof rests on the attacking 
party. The burden can be successfully discharged only by showing that 
the law in question is unreasonable; that is, the enactment is arbitrary, 
capricious, or patently discriminatory. 
Many modern judges and scholars, such as William Rehnquist, 
Robert Bork and Raoul Berger, claim to follow this mode of constitution 
interpretation and also claim to support originalism. They state that 
"democracy requires unelected officials to defer to the decisions of popularly 
elected officials unless thcr is a clear violation of rights protected by the 
Framers of the Constitution.,,89 Following this premise it can be assumed 
• 
that judges who advocate an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation 
26 
• would follow a interest balancing mode of constitutional interpretation. 
The next mode of constitutional interpretation which ·Ducat 
describes is the preferred freedoms or strict scrutiny approach. This 
approach was developed because of a major problem with the interest 
balancing approach - the problem of permanent minorities. The interest 
balancers' "regard for all social interests as pretty much equal and 
interchangeable and its ready application of the maximizing criterion resulted 
in what critics saw as the exploitation of vulnerable minorities by a persistent 
majoritarianism.,,90 Under this theory all statutes are not presumed to 
be constitutional. Instead the Court applies a 3-part test which is set out 
as follows: 91 
1.	 Where legislation abridges a preferred freedom on its face. 
the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that 
is. Ie gislation directly infringing a fundamental freedon is 
assumed to be constitutional until the government demonstrates 
otherwise. 
2.	 the government must show that exercise of a fundamental 
freedom presents a clear and imminent danger; or, in other 
words, the state must establish that the legislation advances 
a "compelling interest." 
3.	 The legislation must be narrowly drawn so as to present a 
precise response to the problem. and must not impair basic 
liberties by its overbreadth; that mean., the regulatory policy 
at issue must constitute the least restrictive alternative. 
• 
Justices who follow a preferred freedoms approach would seem 
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• most likely to be advocates of the symbolism theory as defined by Perry under which certain provisions of the Constitution have "symbolic meaning." 
This mode of constitutional interpretation is also likely to be used by Justices 
who support the fundamental law theory of interpretation described earlier 
because this theory acknowledges "the Court's additional role as the 
expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment.,,92 
It seems that a Justice who believed this would be in favor of allowing 
the Court to establish certain "fundamental freedoms" that are favored 
over other freedoms. This theory would probably also be used by Justices 
who advocate John Ely's theory - process-based modernism because this 
theory "permits the Court to decide cases on the basis of contemporary 
values, but limits such discretion to improving the process of representation 
of adjudication,,93 Also. under the preferred freedoms approach the 
"preferred freedoms" obtain their status from immediate association with 
the maintenance of the democratic process.,,94 
From this it would seem fairly easy to figure out what 
constitutional theory a Justice follows if you know what mode of 
constitutional interpretation he uses or to figure out what mode he will 
use in deciding a particular constitutional issue if you lmow what 
constitutional theory he advocates, but this is not always the case. As 
Phelps and Gray point out in their "The Jurisprudence of Williiam Rehnquist: 
The Relevance of Constitutional Theory," there are two kinds of 
constitutional theory. There is a substantive understanding of what the 
Constitution means and there is an instrumental, or interpretive theory 
of how one should go about ascertaining the Constitution's meaning. As 
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95Phelps and Gray state: 
The two kinds of theory are different, 
though they need not be mutually 
exclusive. A Justice might decide 
constitutional cases in decidedly 
atheoretical ways, being neither coherent 
in substance nor consistent in the mode 
of interpretation. Or a Justice might 
have a very coherent substantive 
understanding of the Constitution, yet 
not incorporate any consistent interpretive 
approach in arriving at his or her 
conclusions. 'Strong' constitutional theory, 
however, requires that a Justice not 
only develop a firm, sure sense of what 
the Constitution means, but also be able 
to ground any conclusions in a 
well-articulated interpretive theory. 
Such a theory of the Constitution is 
'strong' because its interpretive validity 
reinforces its substantive conclusions. 
Phelps and Gray contend that while William Rehnquist's opinions have very 
coherent substantive conclusions, he does not follow a coherent interpretive 
theory. They allege that while Rehnquist alleges he follows the originalist 
theory, a theory which closely resembles the theory they term the historical 
argument, his opinions use argument from all five of the different 
interpretive theories they define. 
The five different categories of interpretive theory which Phelps 
and Gray use in their study are textual argument, historical argument, 
structural argument, doctrinal argument and extrinsic argument. They 
state that the "[tjextual argument takes as its authority the Constitution 
- meaning 96 
itself and grounds itself in the 'plain! of the words'." This textual argument 
is identical to the theory of textualism definel"l earlier. Their theory of 
historical argument is also similar to the theory of originalism defined 
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• earlier. This theory "maintains that the historically demonstrable intentions 
of the Framers should be binding on contemporary interpreters of the 
Constitution.,,97 The structural argument defined by Phelps and Gray "gives 
substantial deference to the text and history of the Constitution. But instead 
of focusing on the meaning of isolated words and phrases of the Constitution, 
a structuralist would be more interested in the overall design and purpose 
of the constitutional enterprise. ,,98 The doctrinal argument, as defined 
by Phelps and Gray, "largely ignores the text of the Constitution and the 
intentions of the Framers. Doctrinal argument derives from a commitment 
to the rule of law - a rule of law constructed from the body of past jUdicial 
decisions.,,99 Finally, the extrinsic argument "allows a Justice to stray 
farthest from the constitutional text in justifying his opinion. Advocates 
of extrinsic argument believe that constitutional jurisprudence is principally 
concerned with allocating values.,,100 
In conducting their study, Phelps and Gray analyzed every 
paragraph of every opinion Rehnquist wrote in constitutional cases from 
1973 to 1978. In this study, three coders were to independently assign 
each paragraph from these opinions to one of seven cateogries. Five of 
these categories are the five different interpretive theories which have 
already been discussed. The sixth category, statement of facts, is to "include 
paragraphs that discuss the facts of the case and its litigation history.,,101 
The seventh category, nonconstitutional argument, should "include arguments 
and discussions that are unrelated to the constitutional matters at hand. 
These paragraphs might deal with matters of statutory construction, or 
• 
rules of procedure, or administrative law.,,102 
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• This study by Phelps and Gray provides some surprising results. 
For example, "Rehnquist's constitutional rhetoric is grounded to a great 
extent (73.2 %) upon doctrinal authority.l03 While this is very much in 
keeping with the balancing of interests approach, it contradicts his own 
assertions that "precedent ought not to prevail when the text, history, 
or structure of the Constitution indicate otherwise.104 Another surprising 
finding made by Phelps and Gray is that "Rehnquist seems remarkably 
unwilling to use textual, historical, or structural argument to any great 
degree.,,105 
It is very surprising that Rehnquist used these three theories 
all together barely 10 percent of the time in the constitutional opinions 
covered in this study. The two other arguments, doctrinal and extrinsic, 
are used by Rehnquist nearly 90 percent of the time. It is very surprising 
that Rehnquist, an avid supporter of originalism, would be deciding cases 
on the basis of these two arguments rather than the three that more closely 
resemble the type of interpretive theory which he says he uses. 
Explanations for these results that were offered by Phelps and 
Gray are first of all that "as the corpus of Supreme Court decisions on 
constitutional matters has expanded the range of opportunities for Justices 
to engage in constitutional entrepreneurship has narrowed.,,106 They state 
also that possibly "this particular mix of cases did not focus on the core 
of Rehnquist's constitutional values, therefore not engaging his constitutional 
theory.,,107 Neither of these seem like valid explanations for the grave 
dispari.!Y'·;: between the theory of constitutional interpretation which 
• 
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• Rehnquist says that he supports and the approach of constitutional interpretation he actually uses. The second explanation offered by Phelps 
and Gray is highly unlikely since they analyzed all 135 opinions which 
Rehnquist wrote in constitutional cases from the beginii.ingof the 1973-74 
Supreme Court Term to the end of the 1977-78 Term.108 What seems 
much more likely is that Rehnquist does not actually incorporate the theory 
of constitutional interpretation which he allegedly supports. Therefore, 
while the constitutional decisions he reaches may be coherent, the approach 
which he uses in interpretitgthe Constitution is not. 
Another example of a Supreme Court Justice whose theory was 
not congruent with his practice was Mr. Justice Black. Black is often noted 
for saying "freedom of speech is absolute" but "the cumulative effect of 
his time, place and manner qualifications on speech - the factors which 
add something to 'speech' so that it becomes 'conduct' - shrink the scope 
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of protected expression to a remarkable degree." Also as Louis Fisher 
points out about Mr. Black,110 
He urged us to 'follow what our 
Constitution says, not what judges think 
it should have said.' But the Constitution 
says nothing about an indigent's right 
to counsel, segregated housing, segregated 
schools, or many other issues that Black 
agreed to decide. Although he spoke 
the language of a literalist, at the same 
time he fought vigorously for the 
incorporation doctrine, which now applies 
most of the National Bill of Rights to 
the states. Like other judges, Black 
looked outside the Constitution for 
guidance. 
As these two examples indicate even Supreme Court Justices 
• 
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• who seem to follow a very coherent method of constitutional interpretation 
may not always practice what they preach. So the particular constitutional 
theory which a Justice advocates may not be the one which he actually 
implements in all cases and the way in which constitutional issues are decided 
probably has more to do with "whose ox is being gored,,111 than the Justices' 
views on how the Constitution should be interpreted. 
A SUGGESTED MODEL FOR
 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
 
I have pointed out many different interpretive and noninterpretive 
theories and have also pointed out certain defects in all of these theories. 
So, what theory should be followed in deciding constitutional issues? I 
suggest that no one theory should be followed. Since the Constitution 
contains some provisions that speak very speCifically and some provisions 
that speak very generally, different approaches in constitutional 
interpretation are needed in different circumstances. 
I believe that the Court should follow a model similar to the 
one suggested by Charles Cole at the end of his article "Constitutional 
Interpretation: A Bicentennial Reflection." This theory satisfies the need 
for a balanced approach to constitutional interpretation. 
According to this theory, "[w]hen the Court deals with the 
Constitution's definitive provisions, the text is determinate and should 
be supremely authoritative.,,112 In these circumstances the Court would 
employ the textualist theory described earlier. 
Next, in dealing with the more general provisions of the 
Constitution and where the text is not determinate, "[t]he interpreter should 
• 
not look within himself to interpret the provision but should seek to ascertain 
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• the adopters' intent.,,113 This inquiry should consider both the Framers' 
and the ratifiers' intent, with emphasis, where possible on the ratifiers' 
intent. "The Framers' and/or ratifiers' intent should consider contemporary 
circumstances in the interpretive process, whether the interpreter is 
concerned with the commerce clause or individual rights.,,114 The difficult 
if not impossible task is obtaining the ratifiers' group intent. 
This difficult task poses a serious problem in the application 
of original intention. In the words of Justice Brennan, "[i]nterpretation 
must account for the transformative purpose of the text. Our Constitution 
was not intended to preserve a preexisting society but to make a new one, 
to put in place new principles that the prior political community had not 
sufficiently recognized. ,,115 
The essential question involved, which was pointed out earlier 
but has not been completely answered is this: how much discretion should 
the Court have in interpreting the Constitution?116 If the Court employs 
a theory which goes beyond the text of the Constitution and the specific 
intentions of its Framers, which I believe is necessary in properly interpreting 
the Constitution in modern times, then it is important that this theory 
grant the Court as little discretion as possible. 
Professor Perry's theory, symbolism, allows the Court "to utilize 
fundamental aspirations of American history and tradition.,,117 On the 
other hand, conceptualism, a theory which was also discussed earlier, 
recognizes that "adjudication may not proceed in the absence of authorization 
from some other original source, and when the text or original history speaks 
clearly, it is binding."l1B 
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• Although some theorists criticize those who offer a balanced 
model which falls between textualism and symbolism, this model is not 
offered as a compromise. It is offered because it is the one that the Court 
generally uses and must use. Textualism and originalism are not always 
119
consistent with the needs of an enduring Constitution. Symbolism and 
fundamental rights allow the Court in many instances to ignore the 
Constitution. But conceptualism is a theory which has worked and will 
continue to do so. "An honest, straightforward application of conceptualism 
will gain respect for the Court - Not diminish it.,,120 
• 35 
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